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James Hampshire
The Cost of Broken Promises or How
Policy Failure Can Help Win Elections
- Immigration and the 2015 UK General
Election
Introduction
1 One function of elections is to enable voters to provide their collective judgement of the
incumbent government. In making this judgement, it seems reasonable to assume that the
government’s policy record – its successes and moreover its failures – will play a role.
However, whether or not voters reward or penalise parties for delivering or failing to deliver
on their policy promises is likely to depend on at least two factors. Firstly, all things being
equal, a policy success or failure is more likely to matter when the policy in question is publicly
visible and widely known. If a party is able to obscure its poor record on a particular issue –
for example by highlighting other issues – or if its record has not been widely debated and
scrutinised through the mass media, then it is more likely to escape electoral punishment.
Secondly, and related to the previous point, policy success or failure is more likely to matter
if it relates to an issue that voters care about. In other words, a government’s record will
matter more on issues that are highly salient and about which voters express clear and strong
preferences.
2 These conditions were all met regarding the Coalition government’s immigration policy record
in the run-up to the 2015 UK general election. In 2010, the Conservatives had committed to
reduce net migration from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands – “no ifs, no buts” as
David Cameron put it. Over the five years of the Con-Dem Coalition, they failed, and failed
spectacularly, to do so. Not only did they not meet their own target, they actually presided over
an increase in net migration, to a figure significantly higher than Labour’s final years in office.
In the latter years of the Coalition this failure was widely observed in the media and, as we will
see, at least one political party made it central to its attack on the Conservatives. Yet rather
than hide the issue, the Conservatives recommitted themselves to the net migration target in
their 2015 manifesto. This was all the more surprising because by 2015 voters considered
immigration to be the second most important issue facing the country (after the economy) and
the majority of them thought that immigration was too high. Given all of this, it might have
been expected that voters would punish the Conservatives at the ballot box.
3 In the event, the Conservatives’ record on immigration did not appear to harm their election
result. In one of the biggest upsets in British electoral history, the Conservatives outperformed
every pollster’s predictions – for reasons that are still unclear – and win an outright majority.
Pollsters were so confounded that the British Polling Council launched an inquiry (on-going
at the time of writing) into how they got it so wrong. A complete explanation of why the
Conservatives did so well and Labour so badly is, of course, complex and multi-faceted and
would require attention to a number of factors: the SNP’s surge leading to Labour’s collapse
in Scotland; the Conservatives benefiting disproportionately from the Lib Dems’ collapse
throughout the UK; Ed Miliband’s poor approval ratings; and the Conservative’s effective
(though false) economic narrative that blamed the deficit on Labour’s supposed profligacy
before the 2008 financial crisis (see for example Bale and Shaw’s contributions to this volume).
So it could be that immigration was simply outweighed by these other factors. In other words,
the Conservatives did well despite failing to meet their own migration target, the counterfactual
being that they would have done even better had they met the target.
4 While intuitively plausible, I think this is incorrect. In this paper I want to argue that in fact
the Conservatives won a majority not despite their immigration policy failure, but in large part
because of it. In other words, their failure to reduce immigration and address public anxiety
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about this issue should be added to the list of reasons why they won, rather than considered
as a factor that they overcame to win. How so?
Promises, promises
5 We have to go back to the previous election in 2010 to understand how the Conservatives
set themselves up to fail, yet succeed. Then as now, the Conservatives enjoyed a lead over
Labour on immigration. Voters had lost trust in Labour’s ability to manage migration and
since the 2004 EU enlargement resulted in large increases in immigration to the UK attitudes
had hardened. As the 2010 election drew near, the Conservatives were keen to exploit their
advantage on this issue. At the same time, they faced a threat from the right, in the form of the
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which since 2005 had increasingly campaigned
on an anti-immigration message. Thus both in its competition with Labour over the centre
ground, and in its efforts to prevent defectors to UKIP on the right, a robust policy on
immigration seemed essential to any Conservative victory.
6 The challenge was to articulate such a policy without falling into the trap of appearing as
the “nasty party”, as arguably the Conservatives had done in the 2005 election, when the
party used none too subtle dog-whistle posters on immigration asking “are you thinking what
we’re thinking?” and moreover promised in their manifesto to withdraw Britain from the
United Nations Refugee Convention. In the party’s 2005 election post-mortem, this draconian
approach immigration was identified as having discouraged some swing voters from voting
Tory and thus contributing to defeat. The new Conservative leader, David Cameron, had
committed to modernise the party, precisely aiming to shed the “nasty” image and make it
more appealing to centrists. So Cameron needed an immigration policy that was tough enough
to exploit the party’s advantage over Labour and prevent defections to UKIP, yet not so tough
as to jeopardise his modernisation strategy.
7 The solution was the net migration target. Cameron first announced in a television interview
that if elected his party would reduce net migration “from hundreds to tens of thousands”
in the course of the next Parliament, a promise that was then included in the Conservative
Party manifesto. At the time, net migration was 255,000 per year, so Cameron had effectively
committed to more than halving it in the space of just five years. The target sounded robust –
it after all committed the party to very substantially reducing migration to Britain – yet it did
not demonise immigrants and had a pleasing technocratic ring to it (even if in reality it was
endorsed by hardly any experts). Of course, in the 2010 election the Conservatives did not
win a majority, but they were the largest party and entered into negotiations with the Liberal
Democrats over the formation of a coalition government. In the Coalition Agreement, the net
migration target was not included as the Lib Dems would not endorse it, but it nevertheless
became de facto government policy, clearly driving a restrictive policy agenda on students and
family migration, and to a lesser extent work migration.
8 Although it made sense politically, the migration target was at best a hostage to fortune.
Net migration is simply immigration minus emigration. Democratic states cannot effectively
control emigration: neither by forcing people to leave nor preventing them from doing so.
Short of becoming an authoritarian state the emigration half of the net migration equation is
thus outside government’s control. The immigration side of the equation is in principle more
controllable, but there are important limitations here too, not least since a significant proportion
of immigration to the UK comes from other EU countries. So long as it remains part of the
EU, the government has no effective control over this inflow which is guaranteed by European
free movement rights. Immigration from outside the EU is more controllable, but (as discussed
below) there are real constraints on government even here.
9 For these reasons, many commentators and academics (including this author) said at the time
that the target was effectively impossible to achieve. It was certainly difficult to see how
the Coalition could both secure an economic recovery (where relative economic strength
would attract immigrants, especially EU free movers) and reduce net migration to under
100,000. Thus two of the Conservatives’ central commitments seemed incompatible, if not
flatly contradictory. The same commentators who pointed this out also typically argued that
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the target would come to haunt the Conservatives. While it might have paid electoral dividends
in 2010, they claimed, the target would soon become an electoral albatross, costing votes at
the next election. In hindsight, while critics were right to observe that the target would not be
achieved, they were wrong to think that this would be politically costly (as we shall see below).
10 Initially, it looked as though the government might get close to the target. Net migration fell
during the first two years of the Coalition, reaching a low of 153,000 in the year to October
2012. From late 2012 onwards, however, net migration started to increase again. By the end
of 2014, the last figures released before the election in May 2015, net migration was 318,000.1
This was not only three times the target and 63,000 higher than when the Coalition was formed,
but higher than at any time since 2005.
11 The failure to reduce migration below the level when they entered office, let alone achieve
their self-imposed target, was certainly not for want of trying. The Coalition government
introduced a slew of restrictive policies across the spectrum of routes.2 Work entry routes
were closed or tightened, and an annual cap was put on the number of skilled workers that
employers could recruit. Businesses, and even some foreign governments, complained loudly
about these changes, and indeed managed to extract some significant concessions, but there
is little doubt that policy on non-EU labour migrants tightened under the coalition. And this
was notwithstanding a Liberal Democrat Business Secretary, Vince Cable, who fought a
running, and often public, battle over immigration policy with Teresa May at the Home Office.
The changes were more dramatic in the areas of international students and family migration.
The financial requirements for sponsors of family migrants were increased, as were English
language requirements for foreign spouses. Financial and language requirements were also
raised for overseas students, and new restrictions were put on students’ rights to work or bring
dependent relatives.
12 These policies failed to reduce net migration for three main reasons. First, and most important,
was the substantial increase in the number of EU citizens migrating to Britain. While free
movement to the UK had dropped off in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis,
especially from Central and Eastern Europe, it picked up again as the UK labour market, while
hardly booming, was in better shape than many other EU countries. In particular, the crippling
effects of the Eurozone crisis on southern European countries – where youth unemployment
reaching staggering levels of up to 50 per cent – created a new flow of young Europeans
in search of work. Cafes and restaurants in London were inundated with university-educated
Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks and Italians fleeing their ravaged economies. Second, even
non-EU immigration, which was affected by all the policies above also increased. The reasons
for this are complicated but again reflect the relative (if not absolute) strength of the British
economy, especially after the Chancellor eased back on austerity in 2012, as well as the path
dependent nature of non-work migration routes. Third, the effect of increased immigration
flows was compounded by the decrease in the number of people emigrating from Britain, as
fewer people went to work or retire abroad.
13 These developments meant that the Conservatives approached the 2015 election campaign
having singularly failed to deliver on one of their headline promises.
Getting away with it? Migration in the 2015 election
campaign
14 Given all of this it was perhaps surprising that the Conservatives chose to reaffirm their
commitment to the net migration target in the 2015 campaign. The 2015 manifesto promised
that they party would “keep our ambition of delivering annual net migration in the tens of
thousands, not the hundreds of thousands”, and blamed the failure to do so – not entirely
inaccurately – on the economic recovery.3 Presumably, the Conservatives took the decision
that reneging on the commitment would do more damage than reasserting it as an ambition.
As the campaign got under way it was unclear how this would play for the Conservatives,
but it was certainly plausible to think that it could damage them, especially with UKIP in the
ascendant.
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15 Furthermore, immigration was by now a highly salient issue and something about which the
electorate had strongly negative attitudes. IPSOS-Mori polls – if such things can be believed
anymore – showed that immigration was considered by voters to be the second most important
issue facing the country (See Fig 1).
Figure 1: IPSOS-MORI Index on most important issues facing the country 1993-2015
16 And the public had strong preferences for more restrictions on immigration. The 2013 British
Social Attitudes Survey suggested that three-quarters of the British population wanted to see
immigration reduced, and over half wanted it to be ‘reduced a lot’ (See Fig 2).
Figure 2: Preferences for level of immigration to Britain, 2013
17 Despite this, immigration did not figure in the campaign as much as might have been expected.
The Conservatives did not want to draw attention to the high level of net migration while
The Cost of Broken Promises or How Policy Failure Can Help Win Elections - Immigration an (...) 6
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XX-3 | 2015
Labour had little to gain from politicising the issue. For both of the main parties immigration
was, as it had been for some time, electorally risky and internally divisive. Immigration is
generally an issue that splits both centre-left and centre-right parties, with the former divided
between cultural conservatives and free market, pro-business interests, while the latter finds
itself caught between left cosmopolitans and internationalists on the one hand, versus labour
market and welfare protectionists on the other.4 In the specific context of the 2015 British
election, these divisions had a particular resonance because were immigration to become a
central aspect of the campaign, both Conservatives and Labour would find themselves having
to defend an unpopular record – the Conservatives’ missed target and Labour’s record of policy
liberalisation when it was in government.
18 Thus while the Conservatives still enjoyed a lead over Labour on immigration they did not
seek to make the issue a major part of their campaign. The Party’s two chief strategists –
the Australian electoral strategist, Lynton Crosby, and the Chancellor, George Osborne –
focused instead on the economic recovery (weak though it was) and how Labour’s alleged
fiscal profligacy meant they could not be trusted with the reins of government.
19 For its part, Labour did not seek to go on the offensive on the missed target because it was
itself increasingly split on immigration and acutely aware of how many of its core voters
thought the party had been too liberal when in office. Instead it staked out a largely defensive
position to present itself as tough on immigration without really attacking the Coalition’s
record. While parts of the party – including both some Blairites and left-wingers – thought
Labour’s record in office should be defended, figures such as John Cruddas, who Ed Miliband
had appointed as Policy Coordinator to write the party’s manifesto, successfully argued that
Labour needed to adopt a robust line on immigration. Thus Miliband apologised for his party’s
supposed mistakes in 2004-2010, admitting that the previous Labour government had been
too sanguine about the effects of immigration, and he made tighter controls on immigration
one of the party’s five election pledges. The pledge for “controls on immigration” adorned a
much-derided campaign mug, as well as the even more derided “Ed Stone” – the surreal stone
slab carved with Labour’s election pledges, which Miliband promised to put in the Downing
Street garden if he was elected Prime Minister.
20 There was an interesting parallel in all of this with the debate on the economy. On both
issues, the Conservatives arguably had a poor record (most economists arguing that austerity
was unnecessary and had in fact harmed the recovery) yet managed to present themselves as
competent while depicting Labour as unreliable. And on both issues, Labour failed effectively
to challenge this narrative – allowing the idea that they were to blame for the deficit and
uncontrolled immigration to take hold.
A fox in the henhouse – the rise of UKIP
21 If Labour’s defensiveness on immigration is perhaps a necessary, it is not a sufficient
condition, to explain how the Conservative’s immigration policy failure contributed to their
electoral success. The missing piece of the puzzle is the United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP), which unlike the major parties did campaign, and campaign vociferously, on
immigration.
22 As its name implies, UKIP began life as a party with the principal aim of withdrawing the
UK from the European Union. Founded in 1991 as the Anti-Federalist League by Alan Sked,
a Professor of History at the LSE, it was renamed UKIP in 1993. For many years UKIP was
effectively a single-issue party, which drew its limited support from Eurosceptic Tories. It
achieved some modest successes, but never looked likely to trouble the main parties. After
a particularly poor performance in the 2005 general election, UKIP elected Nigel Farage, a
sitting MEP, as its new leader. Farage set about trying to widen the party’s appeal with a
broader right-wing agenda in an effort to pick up support from Tories alienated by (what they
saw as) David Cameron’s socially liberal modernisation of the Conservative Party.
23 From August 2010, when he was re-elected as leader following a brief hiatus, Farage
developed a two-pronged strategy for UKIP: first, a focus on developing the party’s
representation in selected local councils to create bridgeheads for national election campaigns;
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and second, adaptation of the party’s core message to target disenfranchised working-class
voters. Election results revealed that UKIP was gaining support in areas with a large proportion
of blue-collar voters. Conversely, it was doing badly in metropolitan areas with higher levels
of education and significant ethnic minority populations. In other words, UKIP’s support was
evolving from a reliance on dyed-in-the-wool Europhobes and the “disgruntled of Tunbridge
Wells” to a more economically marginalised base. Under Farage, UKIP increasingly became
a party of these “left behind” voters: working class, mostly white, and with few educational
qualifications.
24 The central issue chosen to develop this strategy to target the “left behind” was immigration.
UKIP had been long arguing that European integration threatened British national sovereignty,
but this was a relatively esoteric pitch, unable to galvanise voters whose concerns were more
immediate and visceral than monetary union or Brussels “red tape”. Fortunately for UKIP,
the EU and immigration had already begun to fuse as issues in the public mind following the
2004 enlargement round, when thousands of central and eastern Europeans exercised their new
rights as EU citizens to move to the UK. As immigration from Poland and other A8 countries
soared, significant parts of the public, especially those competing for jobs with the newcomers,
began to express growing concern about immigration. This created an opportunity for UKIP
to fuse its longstanding opposition towards the EU with an altogether more electorally potent
issue. It was an opportunity Farage did not pass up. He set about refocusing UKIP’s core
message on immigration, and on European immigration in particular. The only way the UK
can effectively control immigration, he argued, is to withdraw from the EU.
25 Thus UKIP morphed from being a fringe Eurosceptic party into a populist far right party,
with immigration – especially though not exclusively from the EU – at the forefront of its
campaigns. Its focus on EU free movement – rather than Muslim or other non-EU immigrants
– distinguishes UKIP from some other populist far right parties in Europe, but in many ways
it increasingly resembles them. As with other members of this party family it is nationalist,
economically conservative (though it has shifted from a libertarian to more protectionist stance
in recent years) and populist. In Farage it has a charismatic leader who, literally as well
as metaphorically, likes to present himself as a “bloke down the pub”, in contrast to the
cosmopolitan elite of the mainstream parties.
26 This change has certainly widened the electoral appeal of UKIP, in terms of both the socio-
demography and geography of its voters. Without losing its earlier support from Europhobic
ex-Tories in southern England, UKIP has attracted growing support from white working-class
voters across the country, including the Midlands and the North (their support remains more
limited in Wales and especially in Scotland). Indeed, the stereotypical UKIP voter of the 1990s
– a Blimpish ex-Tory living in southern England – is less and less important as an altogether
different group has turned to the party. As Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin pointed out in
2014, UKIP’s support has an increasingly clear social profile: “old, male, working class, white
and less educated”.5 These are “disadvantaged and economically insecure Britons, who are
profoundly uncomfortable in the ‘new’ society, which they regard as alien and threatening.”6
As with many other far right parties in Western Europe, UKIP’s support is nowadays founded
on what Hans-Peter Kriesi calls the “losers of globalization”,7 the growing number of people
for whom the economic, social and cultural changes of globalization are associated with
insecurity and disadvantage, rather than growth and prosperity, and who feel alienated by
mainstream parties who, they believe, represent the interests of cosmopolitan elites.
27 An important implication of this, as Ford and Goodwin have been arguing for some time, is
that UKIP now pose as much a threat to Labour as to the Conservatives. Where UKIP had
once simply hived off voters from the right of the Conservative Party, it now stood to harm
the Labour party by eating into its traditional working-class heartlands. While there was some
limited evidence of this occurring already in the 2010 election it remained a matter of debate
which party stood to lose more as a result of a UKIP surge in the run-up to the 2015 election.
28 UKIP did well in the 2013 local elections, winning 22 per cent of the popular vote and
147 seats, and especially in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, where it emerged
as the largest single party with 26.6 per cent of the popular vote and 24 out of the UK’s
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73 Parliamentary seats. In both of these polls, especially the European elections, UKIP’s
campaign concentrated on immigration. Most of its election posters were about the supposed
harm that free movement caused British workers, and in his media appearances Farage focused
relentlessly on immigration. In one of his more controversial interventions he claimed that
“any normal and fair-minded person would have a perfect right to be concerned if a group of
Romanian people suddenly moved in next door”.8
29 It remained to be seen whether the successes in the local and European elections could be
repeated in the general election, and what effect this would have on the overall outcome. Could
UKIP retain the support it had acquired in these second-order elections, where turn-out is
lower and voters often protest against the main parties, and which moreover are governed by
more proportional electoral systems, unlike the Fast Past the Post system of single member
constituencies, which is notoriously difficult for smaller parties?
30 UKIP’s core message in the general election campaign was essentially the same as in the
EP elections. Although Farage himself fought what many thought a lacklustre campaign, he
still managed to generate media controversy by using the televised leaders debate to attack
migrants for health tourism, and on another occasion blaming his late arrival at a meeting
on traffic congestion caused by “open door immigration.” Unlike Labour, UKIP did make
the Conservative’s failure to meet its net migration target an issue. Indeed, one of its general
election campaign posters was a (quite clever) variation on a theme of a one of its 2014
European election posters. While the 2014 version depicted an escalator running up the white
cliffs of Dover with the caption “No border. No control”, the 2015 poster used the same
imagery but with three escalators to represent the idea that “Immigration is three times higher
than the Tories promised” (see Fig. 3).
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Figure 3a: Spot the difference: UKIP 2014 European Election Posters
Figure
3b UKIP 2015 General Election Posters
31 In the event, UKIP did both spectacularly well and spectacularly badly. The bad news was that
UKIP returned just one MP: Douglas Carswell, a former Conservative who had defected to
UKIP in 2014. This was in stark contrast to some predictions that they could win in several tight
contests. Perhaps most disappointing was the result for Farage himself. Despite concentrating
his efforts on the constituency of South Thanet, he failed to win, prompting his immediate
(albeit short-lived) resignation.
32 But in terms of its popular support the UKIP surge held up pretty well. Across the UK the party
received 12.6 per cent of the vote, and in England, 14 per cent. Their total vote share – nearly
four million votes – was as large as the SNP and the Lib Dems combined (who between them
managed to win 64 seats). Moreover, UKIP came second in more than 120 seats. In terms of
the influence of UKIP’s rise on the outcome of the election, it was here that the effect was felt.
Explaining successful failure
33 Indeed, in 2015 the chief significance of UKIP’s large popular vote spread across many
constituencies lies in the effect that it had on the two main parties’ performance. In short,
while both the Conservatives and Labour lost votes to UKIP, the electoral damage was greater
for Labour. In numerous key marginals, especially in the Midlands and the North of England,
UKIP prevented Labour from taking seats they simply had to win from the Tories.
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34 Before demonstrating this, it is worth pausing to observe how counter-intuitive it is, at least if
one assumes (not unreasonably) that an incumbent party’s policy record on high salience issues
might be expected to affect its electoral fortunes. Given that UKIP campaigned on immigration
and indeed sought to make the Conservative’s migration policy failure an electoral issue, it
might have been expected that the Tories, as the governing party (strictly speaking, the main
party in a coalition) that had presided over an increase in immigration, would be damaged
most. However, while there were voters who abandoned the Tories for UKIP over immigration,
the more significant effect appears to have been Labour voters shifting to UKIP for the
same reason. In other words, while it was the Conservative-led coalition that presided over
increasing net migration, it was Labour that bore the brunt of public frustration on the issue.
Thus Conservative policy failure contributed towards political success.
35 Of course immigration was not the only factor that caused voters to defect to UKIP: a general
disaffection with the mainstream parties and opposition towards the European Union – to the
extent that they can be separated from immigration – were also important. But immigration
was undoubtedly a major factor, especially among former Labour voters.
36 To see how UKIP’s rise contributed towards Conservative victory by harming Labour we can
compare the results of the Conservatives and Labour in constituencies where UKIP performed
very well versus constituencies where UKIP performed relatively badly. As Steve Fisher
has pointed out, where the UKIP vote was up over 14 per cent on their 2010 result, the
Conservatives were down 0.9 per cent and Labour up 1.6 per cent (see Table 1).9 At first glance,
then, it appears that UKIP harmed the Tories. However, to gauge the UKIP effect on each
party’s relative performance what really matters is the difference in each party’s vote in these
seats compared to those where UKIP was not doing so well. In those constituencies where
the UKIP vote was up by less than 7 per cent, the Conservative vote was up by 1.5 per cent
while the Labour vote was up by 6.9 per cent. Therefore, Labour (which remember increased
its total UK vote share by 1.5 per cent compared to 2010) was up 5.3 per cent less where UKIP
did well, whereas the corresponding difference for the Conservatives was 2.4 per cent. Thus
in terms of the popular vote, UKIP hurt Labour more than they hurt the Conservatives.
Table 1: Change in the popular vote of the main parties where UKIP did well versus less well,
2015
Constituencies where
UKIP up <7%
Constituencies where
UKIP up >14%
Difference UKIP
doing less well minus
doing very well
Conservatives +1.5% -0.9% 2.4%
Labour +6.9% +1.6% 5.3%
Source: Author’s recalculations based on Fisher 2015.
37 This effect is even clearer at the level of constituency results, where UKIP stopped Labour
taking seats from the Tories. In constituencies where UKIP did less well (up <7%), Labour
managed to take 6 seats from the Tories. In contrast, where UKIP was polling strongly (up
>14%) Labour did not take a single seat from the Tories. Especially given the collapse of the
Labour Party in Scotland (where of course it faced the even more dramatic SNP surge), it was
these Tory-held English marginals that Labour had to win to have any chance of forming a
government; and it was here that Labour defectors to UKIP helped the Conservatives.
38 There was a strong regional aspect to this effect. One post-election study by the polling firm
Survation found that while UKIP took more votes from the Conservatives than from Labour
in some parts of the country, in the North of England and possibly also in the Midlands UKIP
took 10-15 per cent more of its vote from Labour than from the Conservatives.10 According to
their poll of people who voted Labour in 2010, in the North of England, where Labour lost 16
per cent of its 2010 voters, and in the Midlands, where it lost 11 per cent, the largest share of
lost votes went to UKIP. In the South of England, Labour lost an even higher proportion of its
2010 vote, but here voters broke roughly equally to the Conservatives (38 per cent) and UKIP
(36 per cent). Only in London and Scotland did UKIP not take votes from Labour.
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39 In the North and the Midlands, the defection of Labour voters to UKIP stopped Labour
from taking key marginal seats that it needed to win from the Tories, and also resulted in
them losing supposedly safe seats to the Tories. In Conservative-held constituencies such as
Bury North and Weaver Vale (both Conservative-Labour marginals), the Tories held with
majorities significantly smaller than the number of Labour votes lost to UKIP. And in places
such as Bolton West and Morley and Outwood, seats that Labour expected to hold (the latter
being the constituency of Ed Balls, the Shadow Chancellor), Labour votes lost to UKIP were
instrumental to the Conservatives’ gains. Academics are not generally given to citing UKIP
politicians approvingly, but on this occasion the UKIP candidate for Warwickshire North,
William Cash, the son of Tory Eurosceptic Bill Cash MP, was quite right when he argued
that “the reason the Tories have won the key battleground of the Midlands is that UKIP came
to their rescue. We rode into the flanks of the white working class and captured them [from
Labour]. I had Tory workers coming up and hugging me”.11
Conclusion
40 It is widely known among political scientists who study migration that immigration policy is
replete with unintended consequences. Yet rarely can the political consequences of a migration
policy have been quite so perverse as the case discussed here. Over the course of five years,
the Conservatives’ failure to achieve a high profile commitment, one that was intended to help
them win the 2010 election by capitalising on their lead over Labour and stemming defections
to UKIP, became an electoral benefit by prompting defections of former Labour voters to
UKIP. Counterfactually, had the Tories achieved their net migration target, which would
have meant very substantial reductions in immigration, it seems likely that public opposition
towards immigration and thus UKIP’s appeal would have been diminished, and fewer Labour
voters would have responded to Farage’s populist anti-immigration message.
41 It is tempting to think that George Osborne and Lynton Crosby, the two chief architects of
the Conservatives’ victory, may have sensed this and were happy to let public anxiety about
immigration run high assuming that defections to UKIP were likely to harm Labour more than
their own party. If that was their political calculus then it was a canny one, and it helps to
explain why the net migration target was reiterated in the 2015 manifesto. Whether or not this
is true – and it is only speculation – it is clear is that far from harming the Conservatives,
failure to reduce net migration, let alone meet the target, helped them to victory. A promise
made in 2010 had become a promise broken in 2015; but the latter was even more politically
advantageous.
42 The wider lesson here is that there is such thing as a politically successful policy failure.
Contrary to the logic outlined at the start of the paper, this case shows that under certain
circumstances an incumbent’s failure to achieve its policy goals, even on a highly salient issue,
can not only not matter, but may even contribute towards electoral success. It may sometimes
be to the advantage of an incumbent party to set themselves up to fail, or at least be at ease
with their apparent failure, if they can see a positive political externality. Of course, all of
this depends on the caveat ‘under certain conditions’, which in this case involved an insurgent
party increasingly campaigning on the issue where the incumbent party had “failed”, but where
voter concern was concentrated among core supporters of the opposition party. This is, of
course, a rather specific set of circumstances. And while it is possible to be wise after the fact,
the implications were far from certain in real-time, as they depended on how unpredictable
party political dynamics and issue salience would influence voter behaviour.
43 Whether the trick will work twice remains to be seen. Unless they renounce or quietly resign
the target mid-Parliament, neither of which seems likely, the Conservatives will go into the
2020 election once again defending their record on net migration. Given that there is no more
reason to believe that the target will be achieved this time, the theory of successful failure may
well be put to the test once again. Some of the key variables shaping how this unfolds will
be whether immigration remains as salient an issue for voters in 2020 as it is today, whether
UKIP continues to build upon its populist anti-immigration, anti-EU message, which in turn
will depend on whether the UK is still in the EU following Cameron’s in/out referendum, and
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whether Labour is able to wrest back some of the votes it lost to UKIP. Given this, it would be
unwise to assume that migration policy failure will be so advantageous to the Conservatives
again.
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Abstracts
 
Do policy failures inevitably lead to electoral punishment? This paper examines the role of
immigration in the 2015 UK general election to argue that policy failure can be electorally
successful. In the 2010 election, the Conservatives had committed to reduce net migration
to under one hundred thousand. As majority partners in the 2010-15 Coalition government,
they failed spectacularly to achieve this, overseeing a substantial increase in net migration.
By 2015 immigration was highly salient and the electorate wanted it reduced. The paper
argues that the Conservatives won a majority not despite their migration policy failure, but
in large part because of it. Their failure to reduce immigration and address public anxiety
contributed to the emergence of UKIP as an anti-immigration party, a development which
disproportionately harmed Labour in the 2015 election. UKIP’s anti-immigration message
helped the Conservative win victories in a number of key marginal constituencies, thus
contributing to their unexpected majority.
Le coût des promesses non tenues ou comment des objectifs
manqués peuvent permettre de remporter des élections -
L’immigration et les élections législatives de 2015
Les politiques publiques qui manquent leurs objectifs mènent-elles inévitablement aux échecs
électoraux  ? Cet article analyse le rôle de l’immigration dans les élections législatives de
2015 pour montrer que les objectifs manqués peuvent contribuer à un succès électoral. Lors
des législatives de 2010, les conservateurs s’étaient engagés à réduire les chiffres nets de
l’immigration à moins de 100 000. En tant que partenaires majoritaires dans le gouvernement
de coalition de 2010-2015, ils ont échoué de manière spectaculaire à atteindre cet objectif, et
ont vu au contraire une augmentation substantielle de l’immigration nette. Cet article montre
que les Conservateurs ont gagné la majorité en 2015 non pas malgré cet échec en matière
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migratoire, mais en bonne partie à cause de lui. Leur incapacité à réduire l’immigration
et de répondre aux anxiétés de l’opinion sur le sujet a contribué à l’émergence de UKIP
comme parti anti-immigration, ce qui a nui de manière disproportionnée aux travaillistes. Le
message anti-immigration de UKIP a facilité la victoire des conservateurs dans un ensemble
de circonscriptions marginales cruciales, contribuant ainsi à leur majorité inattendue.
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